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THE STATE OF THE COLLECTIVE
LIVER OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSIONERS
WILLIS W. HAGEN*
There is a statue of a horse and a man in front of the Federal Trade
Commission building in Washington, D.C. It is an artist's conception
of the relation of business and the Commission, the former being de-
picted as a wild horse and the latter as a man attempting to subdue it.
Like all works of art, its meaning is subject to interpretation. It is said
that the artist intended to portray the application of reins upon the wild
practices of industry. It is equally symbolic, however, of business as a
dumb animal being subjected to the arbitrary will of its master. 0
The Federal Trade Commission was created in 1914 and given
carte blanche to determine what constituted an "unfair method of com-
petition in commerce" and to proceed against methods it deemed un-
fair.' Later, in 1938, the Wheeler-Lea Act2 extended its jurisdiction to
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."' The Commission,
thus, administers law as it applies to business morals. No mention is
made in either the original or amended acts as to what standards or
principles shall guide the Commission in the determination of what
constitutes unfairness.
Morality is more than the shallow concept, what's right is right, as
a survey of the literature on the subject will readily reveal. Over the
centuries learned men have contemplated the values and obligations of
Man in depth and there have developed many schools of ethical thought.
An action is right or moral, in the view of a given school of thought,
if it is consistent with a principle verified to the satisfaction of its ad-
*B.A., University of Wisconsin; LL.B., Marquette University; CPA (Wiscon-
sin) ; Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics, University of Wis-
consin-Milwaukee.
' Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §41 (1952).
2Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958), amending the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Senator Wheeler, in the discussion of the
amendment in the Senate said: "Section 5 of the present act is amended, first,
by making unlawful unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. The
present act makes unlawful 'unfair methods of competition' and the Supreme
Court has held that the Commission loses jurisdiction of a case where an actual
or potential competitor is not involved. The amendment makes the consumer
who may be injured by an unfair trade practice of equal concern before the
law with the merchant injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competi-
tor." 85 CONG. REc. 3255 (1938).
s Section 5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act as amended by the
Wheeler-Lea Act reads: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared un-
lawful."
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herents.4 Immorality is action inconsistent with these principles. Obvi-
ously, the same action may be moral or immoral depending upon the
school of moral thought to which one subscribes.
Business morality is the application of moral principles to business
problems. Business practices, therefore, become moral and fair or im-
moral and unfair if they are consistent or inconsistent with a particular
pattern of moral theory. Again, the same business practice may be fair
or unfair, depending upon the pattern of moral theory to which one
subscribes. The power of selection of moral theory to be applied to
business by an administrative agency having the power to act against
business practices amounts to the legislation of business morals."
The proper test of the fairness or unfairness of a business practice,
within the scope of administrative authority, is whether it is consistent
or inconsistent with the standards of fair dealing as reflected in gen-
erally accepted practices in the business community at the time the prac-
tice is employed. 6 Since Congress did not legislate an ethical philosophy
to serve as a guide for the Commission, the Commission's function can
be only to harmonize the conflicting interests of the business and con-
suming public in terms of generally accepted practices. The Commission
must survey, in each case that comes before it, the prevailing practices
in commerce and then determine the fairness of a respondent's practices
in the light of the standards of fair dealing thus ascertained. This is
its duty, not because morality is necessarily relative, but because under
the present state of the law, any approach other than this is admin-
istrative legislation.
7
In Schechter v. United States, both the opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes and the concurring opinion of Justice Cardozo commented ex-
tensively upon the differences between the National Industrial Recovery
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act to indicate why the former
4 To illustrate, one who subscribes to John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism would
accept as a verified principle that those acts are right and good which produce
the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons and his judgments
of morality would turn on that principle, whereas one who subscribes to the
Formalism of Immanuel Kant would view the "universal end of mankind
as the highest moral perfection" so that "each of us must make such a con-
tribution of his own that if all contributed similarly the result would be per-
fection." See MAGILL, PHILOSOPHY 654-659 (1961), for a discussion of Mill's
Utilitarianism and KANT, LECTUREs ON ETHIcs 252 (no copyright indicated).
5 As stated in 1 Am. JuR. 2d Administrative Law §108, at 907 (1963):
"It is a fundamental principle of our system of government that the rights
of men are to be determined by the law itself, and not be the let or leave
of administrative agencies, and this principle ought not to be surrendered for
convenience, or in effect nullified for the sake of expedience.
"Apart from certain exceptions, it is almost universally held that arbitrary
powers may not be conferred on administrative agencies, even though the
courts are authorized to review the exercise of such power."
6 See: Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Societi, 82 F. 2d
692 (2d Cir. 1936). Highlights of Judge Learned Hand's opinion, as they
apply to this discussion, are presented later in the body and notes of this
article.
7See note 5 supra.
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was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and the latter
was not.8 The latter act did not give the power of an arbitrary imposition
of rules of business conduct, but required a consideration of competitive
practices before a specific practice might be condemned. Said Justice
Hughes:
What are "unfair methods of competition" are thus to be deter-
mined in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of par-
ticular competitive methods and of what is found to be a specific
and substantial public interestP (Emphasis added.)
In his concurring opinion Justice Cardozo clarified the distinction when
he said:
If codes of fair competition are codes eliminating "unfair"
methods of competition ascertained upon inquiry to prevail in
one industry or another, there is no lawful delegation of legisla-
tive functions when the President is directed to inquire into such
practices and denounce them when discovered. For many years
a like power has been committed to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion with the approval of this court in a long series of decisions. 10
(Emphasis added.)
Later, Justice Cardozo said: "When the task that is set before one is
that of cleaning house, it is prudent as well as usual to take counsel of
the dwellers.""' The Court was commenting on the Federal Trade Com-
sion Act prior to the Wheeler-Lea Amendment. That amendment made
it unnecessary for the Commission to determine and show the deleterious
effect the practices of a respondent would have on competition. 12 It can-
not be supposed, however, that the broadening of the powers of the
Commission left it without obligation to "ascertain upon inquiry"1 3 pre-
vailing practices so as to determine standards of practices against which
"unfair . . . acts or practices"'14 might be determined. Only by such in-
quiry and appropriate findings can it condemn a practice without exer-
cising its powers in an unconstitutional manner.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, the
eminent jurist Learned Hand wrote: "It is its (the Commission's) duty
to discover and make explicit those unexpressed standards of fair deal-
ing which the conscience of the community may progressively de-
velop."' 5 This article raises the question of whether the Federal Trade
s A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
9 Id. at 533.
20 Id. at 552.
11 Ibid.
12 See note 2 supra.
"3 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra note 8.
14 See note 3 supra.
15 Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, supra note 6, at
696. Earlier in the decision, at page 695, Judge Hand, commenting on the
Commission's "duty to bring trade into harmony with fair dealing," cautioned
that "to the discharge of that duty it should not, however, bring a pedantic
scrupulosity; too solicitous a censorship is worse than any evils it may cor-
[Vol. 47
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Commission has been performing this duty or whether it has been im-
posing an arbitrary censorship upon the morals of businessmen; whether
business is operating under a Government of Law or a Government of
Man; whether the standards of morality are those prevalent in the
business community; whether they are those of a particular moral
philosophy; or whether they turn on the state of the collective liver of
the Commissioners, The answer is not to be found in any pronounce-
ment of principles by the Commission, for there has been none. It is
not to be found in the evidence of prevailing practices adduced at its
hearings for such evidence is inadmissible. If there is an answer, it
can be found only in a detailed survey of its proceedings with a search-
ing look for its possible moral guideposts. Before embarking upon an
analysis of a line of cases in an effort to answer the questions here
raised, however, a few observations on standards of morality as re-
flected by prevailing business practices will be made.
As our Gross National Product approaches $600,000,000,000, in-
dustry finds it increasingly necessary to find new and different ways
to motivate consumer purchases. 16 Motivation research has become an
important factor in marketing programs.r As a result of motivation
studies, marketing campaigns are developed where emphasis is placed
upon emotions, even human weaknesses and frailties, rather than the
merits of the product. The day of competition on the basis of merit
alone has long since passed, if it ever existed. As Vance Packard points
out, merchandisers sell the feeling of security, ego-gratification, a sense
of power and of immortality as well as their products.' The emotional
motives of emulation, individuality and conformity are played upon.
Almost since its inception the automobile industry has traded upon
psychological obsolesence created by annual model change with its con-
sequent stimulation of consumers' inclinations toward ostentation and
prodigality, characteristics which many moral philosophers would place
on the lower end of the scale of morality.' 9 The point here made is that
standards of fair dealing in present day business practice permit of
rect, and a community which sells for profit must not be ridden on so short
a rein that it can only move at a walk."
16Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, FED. RE SERVE BuLL. 1316
(1963), Table titled: "Gross National Product or Expenditure" sets forth
the Gross National Product for the first two quarters of 1963, with quarterly
data adjusted at annual rates, as $571,800,000,000 for the first quarter and
$579,600,000,000 for the second quarter. These figures might be compared
with $284,600,000,000 for 1950 and $502,600,000,000 for 1960.
17See TousLrY, CLARK & CLAM, PRINCIPLES OF' MARKETING ch. 6 (1962):
"Consumer Behavior and Motivation"; ANDERSEN & CATEORA, MARKETING
INSIGHTS ch. 14 (1963): "Why You Buy"; Newman, article from Challenge:
The Magazine of Economic Affairs, Jan. 1959, pp. 13-17; and PAcARaD, THE
HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
Is See PACKARD, op. cit. supra note 17, at 61-70.
29 Aristotle maintained, in his Ethica Nicomachea, that virtue is the choosing of
the mean between extremes of conduct. Among the vices of excess he in-
cluded empty vanity and prodigality. MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 157-162.
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playing upon the emotions of the consuming public, even though such
action may detract attention from the comparative merits of the goods
involved; indeed, the vitality of the distribution of the product of our
free enterprise system requires the widest latitude in the development
and use of motivating techniques. The essence of free competition is
the freedom of businessmen to use whatever motivating techniques
their ingenuity may devise.
The morality or immorality of a business practice does not turn on
its potential for vice if the standard is to be determined from prevailing
practices. Moralists, almost universally, regard promise breaking as im-
moral and, if it be true that it is, as a general proposition, it is all the
more capable of verification in commerce, since the entire foundation
of our economy rests upon promise keeping. 20 Personal bankruptcies,
which involve the wholesale breaking of promises and are, in a large
measure, a result of the easy credit policies of merchants, have sky-
rocketed by more than 450% in the last ten years..2 1 Yet, one would not
seriously contend that the granting of easy credit by some merchants is
unfair to other merchants who sell the same lines of goods on a cash
basis, nor that it is unfair to members of the consuming public in the
light of prevailing practices. Regulation of practices by the Federal
Trade Commission on any pretext of unfairness or immorality would
be a usurpation of Congressional legislative power.
Nowhere in the United States Code is there a prohibition against
the use of the element of chance in the merchandising of goods. Like
other forms of emotional motivation, chance injected into a mer-
chandising plan adds a feature other than merit and thereby tends to
detract from the consumer's rational motivation. Likewise, as easy credit
has a potential for vice, so the consumer who is exposed to a mer-
chandising plan encompassing a chance element, one might reason,
may be led into a life at the race tracks and the slot machines. It
20 Immanuel Kant viewed promise keeping as universal law and catagorically
commanded of persons: "For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone
when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he
pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself
would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in
it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would
ridicule all such statements as vain pretense." KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL
REASON AND OTHER WORKS OF THE THEORY OF ETHICS 40 (Abbot transl.
1898). Even the egoistic ethics of Thomas Hobbes provided that the third
law of nature was "that men perform their covenants made." GARNETT,
ETHICS 126 (1960).
21U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 508 (1963) : Table No. 682, "Bankruptcy Cases Filed,
by Type of Bankruptcy and Occupation of Debtor: 1940 to 1962" shows the
following figures for employees: 1940, 36,846; 1950, 22,933; 1955, 46,163; 1956,
48,784; 1957, 59,053; 1958, 73,379; 1959, 81,516; 1960, 89,639; 1961, 119,117;
1962, 120,742. Other occupations listed are Merchants, Manufacturers, Farmers,
Members of Professions and Other, In business and not in business. The total
number of bankruptcies filed in U.S. District Courts in 1962 was 147,780, the
employee group accounting for over 80% of the total.
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should be noted, however, that there is far less agreement among ethical
philosophers that gambling, even distinct from merchandising is bad,
than there is that promise breaking is immoral 22
An illustration of the use of the element of chance in merchandising
may be seen in a recent advertisement run by Sears, Roebuck and Com-
pany in a number of nationally distributed magazines. The advertise-
ment reads:
If it turns out to be twins, Sears will give you the second layette
free. The minute you buy a layette at a Sears store or through the
Sears catalog, you become eligible to collect another layette ex-
actly like the first-absolutely free. Provided you have twins.
There are more twins born than most people think-one set in
every 100 births. Note: If you have triplets, Sears will give you
two layettes free. Three free for quads, and so on, and on 23
The desire of toiling mortals for a handful of fairy gold is also played
upon by the use of "contests" offering lavish rewards to the winning
consumer-participants. Inverted glass "fishbowls," containing a mixture
of gumballs and tiny toys may be found in almost any drug store, where
a child can insert his penny or nickel and take a chance on getting the
toy he would like to have. The reader is surely familiar with Crackerjack
and the consideration, chance and prize involved in its merchandising.
The marketing of goods by the use of punch boards or push cards has
also been engaged in extensively.2 4 Any use of the element of chance
22The Vatican Weekly, L'Osservatore Della Domencia, in an editorial stated:
"Gambling is not immoral by itself, and the code of canon law prohibits it
specifically only to priests. But gambling can easily become immoral when
'the bet, big or little, goes beyond the economic possibilities of the player, or
when it is subtracted from priority purposes such as family needs." Chicago
American, July 12, 1962.
The promised land was divinely ordained to be divided by chance. "And
the Lord spake unto Moses, saying ... the land shall be divided by lot ...
according to the lot shall the possession thereof be divided between the many
and few." NUMBERS 26:52, 55-56.
23 Look, Sept. 24, 1963, pp. 6, 7. The feature article of the issue was "Morality,
U.S.A." Look, Oct. 8, 1963, p. 15. Minute Maid advertised: "Minute Maid
Company Cash Stakes," "Win a Bushel of Bucks," "$25,000 first prize, $10,000
second prize, $5,000 third prize" for guessing the number of times the word
"orange" appears on the Orange Delight can. In Look, Oct. 22, 1963, p. 26,
Rexall advertised: "Win! and Win Again," "Enter Rexall's Super Combina-
tion Sweepstakes, Grand Prize, 1964 Lincoln Continental plus 2 Week
Continental Vacation," "Entry blanks with full details at your Rexall Drug
Store." In the same issue at page 61: "Enter the 1963 Du Pont 'Zerex' Anti-
freeze Sweepstakes; All you have to do is visit your nearest 'Zerex' dealer
and pick up an entry blank . . . fill in your name . . ., mail . . . and wait to
find out if you are a winner." In the same issue at page 65: "Win a $10,000
College Trust Fund for your child, enter the Great Books Educational Sweep-
stakes, $125,000 in fabulous prizes." Participant fills out entry blank, winners
selected at random from residential telephone listings.
24New York, Pennsylvannia and Illinois courts have held that punchboards are
not gambling devices. See People v. Trace, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 893, 200 Misc. 286
(1951); Commonwealth v. Synder, 16 D.C. 552 (1907); Question Game Co.
v. Pioneer, 273 Ill. App. 187 (1933); D'Orio v. Catalona, 260 Ill. App. 626
(1931).
The mailing of their advertisements and punch cards through the mails
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in any form of merchandising, however, has received the unqualified
and unwaivering condemnation of the Federal Trade Commission since
the early 1930's and its views have been successfully urged upon the
various circuit courts of appeal.2 5 An examination in depth will now be
has been held to be not violative of the postal laws covering lotteries by the
following interpretive authorities: 28 Stat. 964 (1895), 39 U.S.C. 4005 (1962),
(formerly 259 and 732). The administrative statute covering lotteries in the
mails. See Garden City Chamber of Commerce v. Wagner, 100 F. Supp. 769(E.D.N.Y. 1951) ; 18 U.S.C. 1302, the statute providing for criminal punish-
ment for the operation and conduct of a lottery through the United States
mails. See United States v. Halseth, 324 U.S. 277 (1951).
In September, 1961, Congress adopted and the President signed 18 U.S.C.
§1952 (Supp. 1963), which provides in part as follows:
"(a) Whoever . . . uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce,
including the mails, with intent to-
"(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate
the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of
any unlawful activity and thereafter performs or attempts
to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraph (1),(2), nnd (3) shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned for not more than five years, or both.
"(b) As used in this section, 'unlawful activity' means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling . . . offenses in violation of the laws
of the State in which they are committed or of the United
States ... "
Also, in September, 1962, Congress passed and the Persident signed 18
U.S.C. §1084 (Supp. 1963), making unlawful the interstate transmission of
wagering information. Adopted at the same time was 18 U.S.C. §1953 (Supp.
1963), which condemns as unlawful the interstate transportation of any
record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slips, token, paper, writing, or
other device used, or to be used, or adapted, devised or designed for use in
bookmaking, or wagering pools with respect to a sporting event, or in a
numbers, policy, bolita, or similar game. Exempted from its operation is
parimutual betting equipment and other betting equipment shipped into a
state in which such betting is legal under the statutes of that state.
In the statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United
States before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in support of these three
bills, then known as S. 1653, S. 1656, and S. 1657, Mr. Kennedy declared:
"We have submitted to you a series of bills through which we know the
Federal Government can meet its responsibilities and be of great aid and
assistance to local law enforcement, these bills carefully limit the activities
of the Federal Government to the most important and the most dangerous
problems now facing law enforcement. Our purpose primarily is to pre-
vent transmission of gambling information and equipment in interstate
commerce; prevent travel in support of 'business enterprises' involving
gambling, liquor, narcotics, prostitution or travel involving extortion or
bribery and to give the F.B.I. more tools to aid their fellow law enforce-
ment officers."
25 In addition to those cases cited elsewhere in this article, the following have
sustained the Commission's position regarding the use of chance in merchan-
dising: Seymour Sales Co. v. F.T.C., 216 F. 2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1954); U.S.
Printing & Novelty Co. v. F.T.C., 204 F. 2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Gay Games
Inc. v. F.T.C., 204 F 2d 197 (10th Cir. 1953); Feitler v. F.T.C., 201 F. 2d
790 (9th Cir. 1953); Consolidated Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 199 F. 2d 417 (4th Cir
1952); Bock Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 194 F. 2d 611 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Hamilton Mfg.
Co. v. F.T.C., 194 F. 2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Chas. A. Brewer & Sons
v. F.T.C., 158 F. 2d 74 (6th Cir. 1946); Deer v. F.T.C., 152 F. 2d 65 (2d Cir.
1945) ; Lee Boyer's Candy v. F.T.C., 139 F. 2d 112 (7th Cir. 1943) ; Wolf v.
F.T.C., 135 F. 2d 564 (7th Cir. 1943); Keller v. F.T.C., 132 F. 2d 59 (7th
Cir. 1942); Koolish v. F.T.C., 129 F. 2d 64 (7th Cir. 1942); Jaffee v. F.T.C.,
128 F. 2d 261 (9th Cir. 1942); Douglas Candy Co. v. F.T.C., 125 F. 2d 665
(8th Cir. 1942); Kritzik v. F.T.C., 125 F. 2d 351 (7th Cir. 1942); McAfee
Candy Co. v .F.T.C., 124 F. 2d 104 (5th Cir. 1941); Jaffe v. F.T.C., 123 F. 2d
[Vol. 47
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made of the Federal Trade Commission's position against this form of
motivation in an effort to determine whether it is in fact legislating
morality, rather than making explicit the standards which the commu-
nity has developed. Since the examination will involve primarily appeals
of respondents to the various circuit courts of appeal, it will neces-
sarily consider the validity of the decisions of these courts. It must be
kept in mind, however, that these decisions reflect the "philosophy" and
exhortations of the Commission in which the duty to determine "un-
fairness" is reposed.
It all started with the United States Supreme Court case of Federal
Trade Commission v. Keppel & Brothers, Inc., which has served, no
doubt unintentionally, as a foundation of an inverted pyramid of "moral
philosophy.' '26 In that landmark case in unfair practices, the respondent
was engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and distributing
"break and take" package assortments of candies to retail dealers in
the penny candy trade.
The break and take assortments are so arranged and offered for
sale to consumers so as to avail of the element of chance as an
inducement to the retail purchasers. One assortment, consisting
of 120 pieces retailing at 1 cent each, includes four pieces, each
having concealed within its wrapper a single cent, so that the
purchasers of those particular pieces of candy receive back the
amount of the purchase price and thus obtain the candy without
cost. Another contains 60 pieces of candy, each having its retail
price marked on a slip of paper concealed within its wrapper;
10 pieces retail at 1 cent each, 10 at 2 cents, and 40 at 3 cents.
The price paid for each piece is that named on the price ticket,
ascertained only after the purchaser has selected the candy and
the wrapper has been removed. A third assortment consists of
200 pieces of candy, a few of which have concealed centers of
different colors, the remainder having white centers. The pur-
chasers of the candy found to have colored centers are given
prizes, packed with the candy, consisting of other pieces of candy
or a package containing lead pencils, pen-holder and ruler. Each
assortment is accompanied by a display card, attractive to chil-
dren, prepared by respondent for exhibition and use by the dealer
in selling the candy, explaining the plan by which either the price
or the amount of candy or other merchandise which the purchaser
receives is affected by chance. The pieces of candy in the break
and take packages are either smaller than those of the competing
straight goods packages, which are sold at a comparable price
without the aid of any chance feature, or they are of inferior
814 (7th Cir. 1941); Sweets Company of America, Inc. v. F.T.C., 109 F. 2d
296 (2d Cir. 1940); Ostler Candy Co. v. F.T.C., 106 F. 2d 962 (10th Cir.
1939); National Candy Co. v. F.T.C., 104 F. 2d 999 (7th Cir. 1939); Bunte
Brothers, Inc. v. F.T.C., 104 F. 2d 996 (7th Cir. 1939); Minter Brothers v.
F.T.C., 102 F. 2d 69 (3rd Cir. 1939) ; Helen Ardelle, Inc. v. F.T.C., 101 F. 2d
718 (9th Cir. 1939) ; Chicago Silk Co. v. F.T.C., 90 F. 2d 689 (7th Cir. 1937) ;
F.T.C. v. F. A. Martoccio Co., 87 F. 2d 561 (8th Cir. 1932); F.T.C. v. A.
McLean & Son, 84 F. 2d 910 (7th Cir. 1936).
26291 U.S. 304 (1934).
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quality. Much of the candy assembled in the break and take
packages is sold by retailers, located in the vicinity of schools,
to school children.
2 7
After commenting that "the statute does not authorize regulation
which has no purpose other than that of relieving merchants from
troublesome competition or of censoring the morals of businessmen"28
(emphasis added.), the United States Supreme Court, in the only case
it has ever considered involving the use of the element of chance in
merchandising, said:
But here the competitive method is shown to exploit consumers,
children, who are unable to protect themselves. It employs a
device whereby the amount of the return they receive from the
expenditure of money is made to depend upon chance. Such de-
vices have met with condemnation throughout the community.
Without inquiring whether, as respondent contends, the criminal
statutes imposing penalties on gambling, lotteries and the like
fail to reach this particular practice in most or any of the states,
it is clear that the practice is of the sort which the common law
and criminal statutes have long deemed contrary to public policy.
For these reasons a large share of the industry holds out against
the device, despite ensuing loss in trade, or bows reluctantly to
what it brands unscrupulous. It would seem a gross perversion
of the normal meaning of the word, which is the first criterion
of statutory construction to hold the method is not "unfair."29
It is said that extreme cases make bad law. Perhaps, it may also be
said that extreme cases may be used by administrative agencies to
expand their powers. At any rate, Keppel was such an extreme case
dealing, as it did, with a business selling inferior candy, integrated
with a gambling plan, to school children so young that they were "un-
able to protect themselves. '30 Children are said to be wards of the Court
and have always been given a kind of special protection by the law.
Even after their tender years, minors traditionally have been held to
have the right to avoid their obligations. It is not difficult to see, there-
fore, irrespective of one's own particular ethical philosophy, how the
Supreme Court came to condemn the practice in Keppel. What might
be a little more difficult to see, however, is how the language of Keppel
became authority for an eternal injunction against the element of
chance in any form in business practice. The law, developed in the
various circuit courts of appeal, purportedly following the Keppel case
effectively accomplished this.
Walter H. Johnson Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, de-
cided the next year by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, added to
the law the feature that testimony by parents and educators that lottery
27 Id. at 307.
28Id. at 313.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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devices do not have a deleterious effect on children and by manufacturers
that they have no moral or other objection to manufacturing and selling
by means of the devices is irrelevant.3 ' The Court said: "That not all
manufacturers believed the practice to be dishonest or that these manu-
facturers were mistaken in their beliefs was clearly immaterial and
irrelevant. ' 32 Thus, within 12 months did a circuit court not only relieve
the Commission of any burden of establishing what is a fair practice
for purposes of comparison, but also eliminated any opportunity for a
respondent to do so, all on the strength of the language of Keppel,
previously quoted.
Two years following Keppel, in 1936, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Hofeller v. Federal Trade Commission, found in the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court decision, authority to condemn the practice
of selling candy in packages which retailed for 5 cents to 25 cents and
contained various prizes ranging from 1 cent to 3 dollars, which prac-
tice was not aimed at child consumption. 33 The Court said:
It cannot be denied that the persuasive argument in the Keppel
case was based on the fact that the customers of the candy were,
in the main, children. We are not satisfied, however, that the
conclusion there reached is not here applicable. It will be noted
that the Supreme Court emphasized the factor of lottery and
chance 'in determining what constituted an unfair method of
competition, and it spoke in general terms, at times without limita-
tion to instances where consumers were children.
In the Keppel case there are many facts indicative of unfair trade
methods which are present in the instant case. Among such simi-
larities are: Inferior candy sold in the prize packages; a rela-
tively negligible amount of candy was given in return for the
price; substantial diversion of trade from actual or potential
competitors; sale of the candy with the lottery feature in viola-
tion of local law; and competing manufacturers damaged by
refraining from such practices v*
While it was not necessary to the decision of the case, the circuit court,
without any supporting discussion, set the stage for Federal Trade
Commission censorship by saying: "It is quite impossible to escape the
conclusion that where a competitive method employs a device whereby
the amount of the return is made to depend upon chance, such method
is condemned as being contrary to public policy. ' 35 It should most care-
fully be noted that this statement is based by the court on the authority
of Keppel, which said rather that "the practice is of the sort which the
common law and criminal statutes have long deemed contrary to public
31 78 F. 2d 717 (7th Cir. 1935).
32 Id. at 718.
3382 F. 2d 647 (7th Cir. 1936).
4 Id. at 649.
35 Ibid.
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policy." (Emphasis added.) 36 The significance of the change in language
from that of an apparent summary of a survey of common and criminal
law to that of flat condemnation is that the latter was the beginning of
36 Note 29 supra. Twenty-four states now have legalized gambling, as such,
in some form. The following statutes are of interest:(1) N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §7952 (McKinney 19-) as declaring legal
pari mutual betting on horse races, and §487 as legalizing Bingo.(2) N.J. STAT. ANN. §§5:8-25, 5:8-51 (1959) as authorizing and legalizing
Bingo and raffles.(3) N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §284:34 (1955) as declaring pari mutual betting
on horse races legal, and chapter 287 as legalizing Bingo.
(4) FLA. STAT. ANN. §550.16 (1962) as legalizing pari mutual betting on
horse races, dog races and Jai Alai.(5) CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §19594 as legalizing pari mutual betting on
horse races. The playing of draw poker in draw poker clubs has also been
legalized in California.
(6) OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §3769.08 (1963) as legalizing pari mutual bet-
ting on horse races.
(7) Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §436480 (1963) as legalizing pari mutual betting
on horse races.
(8) MD. ANN. CODE art. 788 (1957) as legalizing pari mutual betting on
horse races.(9) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, §§361, 551 (1953) as legalizing pari mutual
betting on horse races.(10) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, §37 (1) (Smith-Hurd 1941) as legalizing pari
mutual betting on horse races. The old gambling statute, chapter 38, §121 (b)
and §344 which prohibited punchboards under certain conditions, and the new
chapter 38, §28-1 which replaced them in 1961 and which does not prohibit
or mention punchboards.(11) NEv. REv. STAT. §464.050 (1960) as permitting various forms of
gambling under license.
(12) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4699.5 as legalizing betting on horse trotting
races given by regularly incorporated trotting associations.(13) R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §414-2 (1956) as permitting various organiza-
tions to operate Bingo games, and §41-4-2 as authorizing betting on horse races
on the pari mutual system.
(14) S.D. CODE §53.05 (Supp. 1960) as authorizing horse races and betting
thereon under the certificate system.
(15) MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §94-2401 (1947) as authorizing organizations,
drug stores and other places of business to maintain card games for their
members or customers and "trade stimulators" such as "pull boards" and
other boards, where the board's return does not exceed the retail price of
the prize. Also §94-2425, as legalizing betting on horse races.
New Hampshire recently enacted into law a bill establishing a state lot-
tery. While lotteries were common in the early history of the United States,
having been used to found Columbia University and to help finance Harvard,
Yale, Dartmouth and Williams, the New Hampshire lottery is the first in
modem United States history since 1894. For a discussion of the attitude
of the New Hampshire citizens toward the bill, see King, I'm Not Ashamed
of Our Lottery! This Week, July 14, 1963. For a well-written monograph
presenting the views against legalized garpbling, see PETERSON, GAMBLING,
SHOULD IT BE LEGALIZED (1951).
It is interesting to note that in 1950 the Congress of the United States
enacted 18 U.S.C. 1305 (1950), which declares it to be legal to give prizes
in fishing contests for specie, size, weight or quality of fish caught.
Four years later, in 1954, Congress imposed a stamp tax of $50.00 on
persons who receive wagers. The curious language used in the statute creates
the impression that the payment of $50.00 per year is a sort of license fee
for the right to engage in the business of accepting wagers. Section 4901
provides: "Condition precedent to carrying on certain business.-No person
shall be engaged in or carry on any trade or business subject to the tax
imposed by section 4411 (wagering) . . .until he has paid the special tax
therefor."
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the closing of the door upon any future consideration of the dynamics
and progressive development of the morality of business practices.
In the early 1940's Modernistic Candies determined to market
chewing gum by means of a "Ballgum" board, whereby the consumer
would punch paper to determine the flavor he would get. This practice
disgusted the Federal Trade Commission to the point where they issued
a complaint which was ultimately considered by the Seventh Circuit
Court in Modernistic Candies v. Federal Trade Commission in 1944.37
While still ostensibly having the welfare of children in mind, the
"what's right is right" approach to business ethics had begun to get
such a firm hold in this area of business practice that the court felt
constrained to by-pass any discussion of the broad moral principles and
to ridicule counsel for Modernistic Candies with a projection of the
Court's personality into its opinion:
Counsel for the petitioner discussed at great length from a
sociological point of view, the age-old problem of the gambling
instinct in the human being. According to his analysis, gambling
perverts our entire economic system; thus, insurance contracts
are gambles, stock and grain exchange transactions are gambles,
and the farmers' dependence on the weather is a gamble. Coun-
sel's attempt to apply this analysis to the present case left us
cold and unimpressed.
He even reminded us that our great idol, Mr. Chief justice Mar-
shall in his day attended the horse races and wagered with his
clergyman. In fact, they ran a book. As indicating how times
have changed, and how even our coarse nature has yielded to the
protecting care of governmental policy, we confess we do not
even know a bookmaker, clerical or otherwise, and our passes
to the beautiful race tracks around Chicago lie in our desk un-
used. (Author's note: But not destroyed!)
The device used in the case at bar is too apparently allied with
the purpose of merchandising by gambling to appear to a court
as being a fair trade practice, particularly designed as it is to
appeal to children's trade and to appease their desire to get some-
thing for nothing.38
The Globe Cardboard Novelty Co. v. Federal Trade Commission
case, decided in 1951 by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, did not
involve merchandising by means of the element of chance but rather
the sale of punch boards and push cards themselves.39 The court, how-
ever, pointed out, with approval, how static the law had become some
18 years after Keppel, when it said:
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, (1934), it has been
settled law that the sale of merchandise by lottery methods con-
stitutes an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the
37 145 F. 2d 454 (7th Cir. 1944).
38 Id. at 454, 455.
39 192 F. 2d 444 (3d Cir. 1951).
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Federal Trade Commission Act. Thus, we accept as our starting
point the proposition that it is contrary to the public policy of
the United States for sellers to market their goods by taking ad-
vantage of the consumer's propensity to take a chance.40 (Empha-
sis added.)
In 1952, two cases which also involved the sale of punch boards and
push cards in and of themselves were considered in the circuit courts.
In Lichtenstein v. Federal Tradie Commission4' the extent of the Ninth
Circuit Court's consideration of the moral aspects of the practice was:
We are of the opinion that the petitioner's use of interstate com-
merce to ship these devices to be used in intrastate commerce in
the gambling disposition of merchandise to the ultimate con-
sumer is one of the "unfair ... practices in commerce" subject
to the preventive control of the Commission.
42
The language of the Supreme Court in Phalen v. Virginia, 1850,
8 How. 163, 49 U.S. 163, 12 L. Ed. 1030, as to the "pestilence"
of lotteries which "enters every dwelling ... reaches every class
. . . and preys upon" and "plunders the ignorant and simple"
applies with force many times multiplied to the spread of lottery
methods into line after line of merchandise. 4
3
It is interesting to note the application of the 1850 fact situation to the
1950 business practice. In Zitserman v. Federal Trade Commission,44
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not feel that even reference to
the 1850 situation was required when it said:
It is now well settled by controlling decisions that the sale of
goods by a plan or method which involves the use of a game of
chance, gift enterprise or lottery is a practice which is contrary
to the established policy of the Government of the United States
and violative of the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 (Emphasis
added.)
But are business practices dynamic or well settled?
The most recent cases in this area have involved the mail order
selling of merchandise through the mailing of push cards to members
of the public from which sales of chances are made by a member of
the public to others, who, depending on chance, receive merchandise or
nothing, the seller receiving for his efforts a duplicate of the main
item of merchandise offered on the card. In these cases there have been
no complaints as to the quality of the merchandise offered or as to the
total value of the merchandise given by the mail order seller in relation
to the total sum of the chances provided for on the card. Neither has
the involvement of children or the good faith of the seller been in issue.
4oId. at 446.
41 194 F. 2d 607 (9th Cir. 1952).
42 Id. at 609.
43 Id. at 611.
44200 F. 2d 519 (8th Cir. 1952).
45 Id. at 522.
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No questions of violation of federal or state criminal or civil law, other
than the Federal Trade Commission Act, have been raised. The sole
question has been whether the practice is unfair.
In Surf Sales Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,8 seventh circuit,
the moral issue in the 1958 business climate was dismissed with a
simple:
The law is now firmly established that the practice of selling
goods by means which involve a game of chance, gift enterprise
or lottery, including push cards such as we have here, is con-
trary to the established policy of the United States .... 4,
In Goldberg v. Federal Trade Commission,48 seventh circuit, in 1960:
Mindful of the admonition that no conclusions are to be drawn
from the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, it may be
noted in passing that the opinion in Keppel is the last statement
on this subject by that court since 1934.49
After acknowledging the arguments advanced by petitioners in Wren
Sales Company v. Federal Trade Commissipn, ° seventh circuit, the latest
pronouncement on the subject as of this writing, the court said: " ...
we have concluded that our decisions, cited above, were not in error
and that it is now established that the practices outlined above are con-
trary to the public policy of the United States ....51
In the almost 30 years since Keppel, its holding has been literally
rubber stamped in no less than 34 decisions, 14 of which were decided
in the seventh circuit.- In none of these cases has evidence of the stand-
ards of fair dealing in the contemporary business community been ad-
mitted and it looks like it never will. The closed nature of the proposi-
tion in the view of the Commission was clearly indicated by Commis-
sioner Anderson in his opinion in the case of Max H. Goldberg"3 when
he said: "In view of the numerous decisions on the point, it is difficult
to believe that a respondent can contend seriously that such a practice
does not constitute a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
' 5 4
and the attitude of the Commission's attorneys was no doubt correctly
stated by Mr. Pope in the oral argument In the Matter of Dandy Prod-
ucts, Inc.,5 5 when he said: "Mr. Hagen has said right or wrong depends
on the standards of the community, whether it is right or wrong. But,
46259 F. 2d 744 (7th Cir. 1958).
471d. at 746.
48 283 F. 2d 299 (7th Cir. 1960).
49 Id. at 302.
50296 F. 2d 456 (7th Cir. 1961).
- Id. at 457.
52Note 25 supra.
53 56 F.T.C. 582 (1959).
54 Id. at 586.
55 FTC Doc. No. 8467.
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if something is right, it is right. If it is wrong, it is wrong. It is not a
variable. 5 6
The fact that there has been a consistent rubber stamping of Keppel
does not give its principle validity in modern day business practice. It
must be kept in mind that all of* the decisions have been by circuit
courts of appeal whose attitude is that they have no business taking a
new or different position until the Supreme Court chooses to modify
or overrule Keppel. One must also keep in mind that an administrative
agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission, which acts both as
prosecutor and judge, though ostensibly acting impartially, cannot help
but develop a prosecution-complex and is not likely to give up any
power it has or add to its burdens in the conduct of litigation. Hence,
the dilemma and the static nature of the law in this area.
Commissioner Lowell B. Mason, who served on the Commission
11 of the 30 years of Keppel, until November of 1956, in his excellent
book, The Language of Dissent,57 sets forth what he calls "Mason's
Law." It holds, he says, that:
... bureaucracy will arrogate to itself all power available under
a statute in spite of the limitations against tyranny in the Con-
stitution. This it will do, quietly and unobtrusively, through de-
cisions at the lowest rung of the quasi-judicial ladder where the
issue seldom meets the eye of the public.58
He illustrates the erosion of the constitutionally guaranteed civil rights
of businessmen, such as the prohibitions against ex post facto trials,
with the dissenting opinions which he entered in the various cases which
he heard. 59 He speaks of bureaucracy as amoral, as the state personi-
fied: "But what if you said to the man next day, 'My friend, where is
the boundary line between my property and yours?' and he were to
reply, "'I refuse to tell you. But beware if you step over it-I shall
shoot.' "60
In its decisions of what is fair and what is unfair in business prac-
tices the Federal Trade Commission is making the moral judgments of
the business community. Moral judgments presuppose and must be
predicated upon moral principles. What, then, are these principles?
What is the texture of the moral theory? Is it Aristotle's moderation
6 1
56 Id., Official Transcript of Proceedings, at 53.
57 MASON, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT (1959).
5s Id. at 35.
59 Id. at 36. Mason avers that, in addition to the abridgment of prohibitions
against ex post facto trials, administrative agencies have impinged upon other
"fundamental concepts of Anglo-American jurisprudence," including the
presumption of innocence, statutes of limitations upon actions, rules against
hearsay evidence, the defendant's right to his day in court and the prohibition
against prosecutors acting as judges in their own cases.
60 Id. at 278.
61 Note 19 supra.
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or Hobbes' egoism ?" Is it Bentham's utilitarianism 63 or Kant's universal
law?64 Is it Perry's harmonization of conflicting interests 5 or Hersko-
vits' relativism66 ? Whatever it is, it has never been announced by the
Commission and no thread of ethical thought is perceptible weaving
through its decisions. If there is an ethical theory underlying its de-
cisions the writer's analysis of it is that the Commission and, hope-
fully, the businessman will intuitively know what the latter's duty is,
what he ought to do, what action is right, what is wrong and what ends
are good or bad.
The Federal Trade Commission Act and its resulting regulation has
62 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. 11, 13, 15, 17 & 18 (Molesworth ed., 1651), as re-
printed in excerpts in RANDALL, BUCHLER, & SHIRK's, READING IN PHILOSO-
PHY 288-305 (1959), viewed Man, the individual, as particles in motion toward
endless desires and held that objects of desire are therefore called "good."
He believed that all motivation is egoistic and that Man is in a constant
state of war-like competition. As a consequence, reason and prudence de-
mands of us three moral principles, which he referred to as laws of nature:
first, seek peace; second, be content with as much liberty as you would allow
other men against yourself and; third, keep covenants made. He believed that
to keep peace, absolute, unquestioned authority of the State is essential, for
otherwise there can be no moral rights or peace. See also MAGILL, op. it.
supra note 4, at 394-395, and GARNETY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 123-128.6 3
BENTHAM. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION(1789), as reprinted in BuRTT, THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FRom BACON TO
MILL (1939), analyzed in MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 551-556, and criticized
in GARNETT, op. cit. supra note 20, at 166-172, propounded "the principle of
utility" as fundamental in both morals and legislation, that is, the obligation
of the individual to promote the greatest possible happiness for the greatest
number. In his development of this principle, he believed that the moralist and
lawmaker must consider the value of particular pleasures in connection with
the morality of particular acts and the ends of legislation. He believed that
all punishment was wrong and should only be administered for the exclusion
of greater evil.
64 KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, as translated
by ABBOTT, KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS 12(6th ed. reprint 1948), speaks of the "Will" as "the supreme good and condi-
tion of every other, even of the desire of happiness." At page 38, he maintains
that "there is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only
on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should be-
come a universal law." Illustrating this concept, on pages 39-41, he shows how
suicide, promise breaking, neglect of one's natural capacities and a lack of
concern with the wretchedness of one's fellow man are inconsistent with
"universal law" and, hence, immoral. Also see MAGILL, op. Cit. supra note 4,
at 545-551 and GARNETT, op. cit. supra note 20, at 65. Ralph Barton Perry, who,
incidentally is quoted in Commissioner Mason's book, op. cit. supra note 57,
at 274, as stating that "the efficacy of law depends on ... lawabidingness,"
developed his theories of ethics in PERRY, GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE (1926)
and PERRY, REALMS OF VALUE (1954). In essence, the central ideas of his
views upon morality are that an object has value only to the extent that we
have an interest in it and that morality is the harmonization of conflicting
interests. He believed that Man should work toward a harmony of coopera-
tion. Morality, he contended, is the integration of interests, rendered harmoni-
ous without losing their identity. Also see' MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 4, at
874-880.
66 Melville Herstkovits treats ethical evaluations as "relative to the cultural back-
ground out of which they arise." See HERsKOvITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS 63.
Under this view there are no cross-cultural norms, and an act is moral if
it is consistent with the customs, institutions and moral standards of a given
culture.
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been a part of our American jurisprudence for almost 50 years. Its
encroachments upon the freedom of business enterprises have been in-
creasing continuously. The legal principle of stare decisis has caused
those encroachments to become "well settled, 6 7 "firmly established,"6 8
and no longer "seriously" contestible. 9 The ultimate result of the present
direction of the law is toward a static, hamstrung business community.
But this tide can be turned and it is the moral obligation of American
businessmen to turn it. Businessmen and the lawyers who represent
them must realize that they are dealing in ethical philosophy and they
must familiarize themselves with philosophical thought .They must
approach the ethical issue from an ethical point of view. They must
develop an ethical philosophy of business. They must pursue their
causes beyond the circuit courts of appeal and their arguments must
be framed upon ethical, philosophical lines. If the philosophy of Ameri-
can business is to be a matter of law, then it is high time that its prin-
ciples be litigated and resolved.
67 Note 45 supra.
68 Note 47 supra.
69 Note 54 supra.
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